Closing the Door on Solitary Confinement
Photo by Ye Jinghan on Unsplash
By Senator Randolph Bracy III
This op-ed was originally published at the Orlando Sentinel [Not available UK/EU]
This op-ed was originally published at the Orlando Sentinel [Not available UK/EU]
Recently, a federal lawsuit was brought against the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) over its excessive reliance on solitary confinement, despite an abundance of information about its damaging effects. Some critics warn that solitary confinement might be increasingly used as a management tool by understaffed correctional officers in many overcrowded state prisons. It has been documented that some inmates spend years, sometimes decades, in solitary confinement, with breaks of only one or two hours each day.
Studies show that this has crippling effects on a person’s mental health and increases the chance of recidivism, if that inmate is lucky enough to make it out of prison. Many are not so fortunate. Research suggests that individuals who are placed in solitary confinement are much more likely to commit suicide than those in the general prison population[1][2][3]. Out of the 80 FDC inmates who committed suicide between January 2013 and August 2018, 48 were in solitary confinement, and an additional 24 had previously been in solitary[4].
Furthermore, after a period of solitary confinement, inmates are much more likely to engage in misconduct or hostile behavior towards correctional officers and other inmates, rendering the use of solitary confinement as a behavior management tool counterproductive at best, and potentially deadly at its worst[5]. Like many other practices in our state’s criminal justice system, the use of solitary confinement is also marked by racial bias: while 16.9 percent of Floridians are black[6], they represent 47 percent of the state’s prison population, and at least 60 percent of individuals placed in solitary confinement[7].
Not long ago, I visited a solitary confinement cell. The frigid concrete space featured a bare toilet and little else. I was struck by how small and enclosed it was. My instinct would not allow me to venture too far in, lest I get a whiff of claustrophobia. It became immediately clear to me how confinement to a space so austere, both materially and psychologically, could result in grave damage to one’s mental state.
While the use of solitary confinement is declining in certain states, and research increasingly demonstrates its deleterious effects on mental health, Florida remains an unfortunate outlier in this regard, with its percent of inmates housed in solitary confinement hovering at double the national average[8]. This legislative session, I plan to address Florida’s overuse of solitary confinement. Too many deaths in Florida’s prisons have resulted from solitary confinement. It’s time for the Florida Legislature to step up and end the inhumane practice of solitary confinement.
Senator Randolph Bracy III represents much of western Orange County, FL in the Florida Senate. He sits on the Florida Senate Criminal Justice Committee and serves as Vice Chair of the Florida Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Criminal & Civil Justice.
[1] Griest, S. E. (2012). The torture of solitary. The Wilson Quarterly, 36(2), 22-29.
[2] SPLC: Solitary confinement can cause mental illness, Southern Poverty Law Center (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/ news/2017/10/16/splc-solitary-confinement-can-cause-mental-illness
[3] Fatos Kaba, et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, Am. J. Public Health 104(3): 442-447 (Mar. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3953781/
[4] Class Action Lawsuit Challenges Massive Overuse of Solitary Confinement in Florida Prisons, Florida Justice Institute (May 9, 2019), https://www.floridajusticeinstitute.org/our-work/class-action-lawsuit-challenges-massive-overuse-of-solitary-confinement-in-florida-prisons/
[5] Weir, K. (2012). Alone, in ‘the hole’: Psychologists probe the mental health effects of solitary confinement. Monitor on Psychology, 43(5), 54-56.
[6] QuickFacts Florida, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fl.
[7] SPLC: Solitary Confinement: Inhumane, Ineffective & Wasteful, Southern Poverty Law Center (April 4, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_solitary_confinement_0.pdf
[8] Reforming Restrictive Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-in-Cell, (Oct. 10, 2018), at 4, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_revised_sept_25_2018.pdf.
Studies show that this has crippling effects on a person’s mental health and increases the chance of recidivism, if that inmate is lucky enough to make it out of prison. Many are not so fortunate. Research suggests that individuals who are placed in solitary confinement are much more likely to commit suicide than those in the general prison population[1][2][3]. Out of the 80 FDC inmates who committed suicide between January 2013 and August 2018, 48 were in solitary confinement, and an additional 24 had previously been in solitary[4].
Furthermore, after a period of solitary confinement, inmates are much more likely to engage in misconduct or hostile behavior towards correctional officers and other inmates, rendering the use of solitary confinement as a behavior management tool counterproductive at best, and potentially deadly at its worst[5]. Like many other practices in our state’s criminal justice system, the use of solitary confinement is also marked by racial bias: while 16.9 percent of Floridians are black[6], they represent 47 percent of the state’s prison population, and at least 60 percent of individuals placed in solitary confinement[7].
Not long ago, I visited a solitary confinement cell. The frigid concrete space featured a bare toilet and little else. I was struck by how small and enclosed it was. My instinct would not allow me to venture too far in, lest I get a whiff of claustrophobia. It became immediately clear to me how confinement to a space so austere, both materially and psychologically, could result in grave damage to one’s mental state.
While the use of solitary confinement is declining in certain states, and research increasingly demonstrates its deleterious effects on mental health, Florida remains an unfortunate outlier in this regard, with its percent of inmates housed in solitary confinement hovering at double the national average[8]. This legislative session, I plan to address Florida’s overuse of solitary confinement. Too many deaths in Florida’s prisons have resulted from solitary confinement. It’s time for the Florida Legislature to step up and end the inhumane practice of solitary confinement.
Senator Randolph Bracy III represents much of western Orange County, FL in the Florida Senate. He sits on the Florida Senate Criminal Justice Committee and serves as Vice Chair of the Florida Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Criminal & Civil Justice.
[1] Griest, S. E. (2012). The torture of solitary. The Wilson Quarterly, 36(2), 22-29.
[2] SPLC: Solitary confinement can cause mental illness, Southern Poverty Law Center (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/ news/2017/10/16/splc-solitary-confinement-can-cause-mental-illness
[3] Fatos Kaba, et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, Am. J. Public Health 104(3): 442-447 (Mar. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3953781/
[4] Class Action Lawsuit Challenges Massive Overuse of Solitary Confinement in Florida Prisons, Florida Justice Institute (May 9, 2019), https://www.floridajusticeinstitute.org/our-work/class-action-lawsuit-challenges-massive-overuse-of-solitary-confinement-in-florida-prisons/
[5] Weir, K. (2012). Alone, in ‘the hole’: Psychologists probe the mental health effects of solitary confinement. Monitor on Psychology, 43(5), 54-56.
[6] QuickFacts Florida, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fl.
[7] SPLC: Solitary Confinement: Inhumane, Ineffective & Wasteful, Southern Poverty Law Center (April 4, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_solitary_confinement_0.pdf
[8] Reforming Restrictive Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-in-Cell, (Oct. 10, 2018), at 4, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/liman/document/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_revised_sept_25_2018.pdf.
Making Cold War Universities in the Middle East
American University of Beirut, 1904. (NEST Digital Library)
Over 150 years ago, a small college was founded in Beirut by American missionaries. The Syrian Protestant College (SPC) was established before the era of American hegemony in the Middle East. Yet its increased prominence mirrored Washington’s growing interests and concerns in the region.
The SPC was later renamed the American University of Beirut (AUB). AUB was not the only educational institution founded by American missionaries in the region. It was joined by Robert College and the American College for Girls in Istanbul (now the site of Boğaziҫi University), Izmir’s International College in Turkey, Allepo College in Syria, the American College of Sofia, Bulgaria, and Athens College in Greece. These colleges were part of the U.S.-based Near East College Association (NECA). Although the American University in Cairo (AUC) was founded after World War I, it would not join the NECA until the 1960s due to opposition from other members of the organization.
Prior to World War II, the United States had limited interests in the Middle East. After oil concessions, the educational institutions founded and operated by American missionaries were arguably Washington’s main concerns in the region. This was also reflected in how the NECA viewed the goal of the colleges and schools. In 1931, the U.S.-based Director of the Near East College Association, Albert W. Staub, explained to William A. Brown, a member of the organization and later President of its Board, that the NECA’s goal was: “to help the peoples of these countries and not to perpetuate or to propagate American customs or institutions.”1
America’s Sheet Anchors
However, Washington’s perception of American educational institutions in the region changed during World War II. In early 1942, German forces pressed an offensive in North Africa. Their initial goal was the Suez Canal and eliminating Britain’s position in Egypt and the broader Middle East. General William Donovan, the head of the U.S.’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), believed that the students and alumni of the American educational institutions could play an important role against the Nazis. Donovan argued that the students and alumni of the universities and colleges could support Allied war efforts, including conducting sabotage and guerrilla actions against the Nazis. Although the German offensive failed and Donovan’s plan was not tested, Washington’s view of the beneficial role American educational institutions could play expanded in the postwar era.2
The American colleges and universities also sought a larger role in the new American-led international order, especially AUB. In letters to the U.S. State Department, AUB President Bayard Dodge argued that the university could benefit the United States and the newly independent Arab states. Dodge believed that AUB was the only institution in the region that could successfully train the next generation of Arabs. “The Arab World is at a crossroads,” he warned, “Whether it becomes sympathetic with our democratic Anglo-Saxon civilization, or is dominated by some other culture, like Pan-Islamism or Communism, will depend largely upon the coming generation.” He concluded that “unless America does her part at this time, the Arab World cannot hope to have commercial stability or political peace.”
In the early postwar era, Washington’s financial support for American educational institutions in the region was minimal. The universities and colleges preferred the appearance of independence from the United States, especially due to the conflict over Palestine and Washington’s support for the Zionist movement. However, they also sought the benefits of political support from the U.S. State Department. Some members of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Division were former missionaries or their children and were strong advocates for the American educational institutions, especially AUB and AUC. Writing to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson in May 1946, Gordan Merriam, the chief of the Near East Division and a former instructor at Robert College in Turkey, explained that the universities “have taken more than a century to build up, and they constituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily weak.”
The SPC was later renamed the American University of Beirut (AUB). AUB was not the only educational institution founded by American missionaries in the region. It was joined by Robert College and the American College for Girls in Istanbul (now the site of Boğaziҫi University), Izmir’s International College in Turkey, Allepo College in Syria, the American College of Sofia, Bulgaria, and Athens College in Greece. These colleges were part of the U.S.-based Near East College Association (NECA). Although the American University in Cairo (AUC) was founded after World War I, it would not join the NECA until the 1960s due to opposition from other members of the organization.
Prior to World War II, the United States had limited interests in the Middle East. After oil concessions, the educational institutions founded and operated by American missionaries were arguably Washington’s main concerns in the region. This was also reflected in how the NECA viewed the goal of the colleges and schools. In 1931, the U.S.-based Director of the Near East College Association, Albert W. Staub, explained to William A. Brown, a member of the organization and later President of its Board, that the NECA’s goal was: “to help the peoples of these countries and not to perpetuate or to propagate American customs or institutions.”1
America’s Sheet Anchors
However, Washington’s perception of American educational institutions in the region changed during World War II. In early 1942, German forces pressed an offensive in North Africa. Their initial goal was the Suez Canal and eliminating Britain’s position in Egypt and the broader Middle East. General William Donovan, the head of the U.S.’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), believed that the students and alumni of the American educational institutions could play an important role against the Nazis. Donovan argued that the students and alumni of the universities and colleges could support Allied war efforts, including conducting sabotage and guerrilla actions against the Nazis. Although the German offensive failed and Donovan’s plan was not tested, Washington’s view of the beneficial role American educational institutions could play expanded in the postwar era.2
The American colleges and universities also sought a larger role in the new American-led international order, especially AUB. In letters to the U.S. State Department, AUB President Bayard Dodge argued that the university could benefit the United States and the newly independent Arab states. Dodge believed that AUB was the only institution in the region that could successfully train the next generation of Arabs. “The Arab World is at a crossroads,” he warned, “Whether it becomes sympathetic with our democratic Anglo-Saxon civilization, or is dominated by some other culture, like Pan-Islamism or Communism, will depend largely upon the coming generation.” He concluded that “unless America does her part at this time, the Arab World cannot hope to have commercial stability or political peace.”
In the early postwar era, Washington’s financial support for American educational institutions in the region was minimal. The universities and colleges preferred the appearance of independence from the United States, especially due to the conflict over Palestine and Washington’s support for the Zionist movement. However, they also sought the benefits of political support from the U.S. State Department. Some members of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Division were former missionaries or their children and were strong advocates for the American educational institutions, especially AUB and AUC. Writing to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson in May 1946, Gordan Merriam, the chief of the Near East Division and a former instructor at Robert College in Turkey, explained that the universities “have taken more than a century to build up, and they constituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily weak.”
The Dulles Brothers (Times Books)
With the emerging Cold War, the State Department viewed the universities as vanguards of American ideals and values in a vital and strategic area. Writing to the Ford Foundation in February 1951, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee argued that the “graduates of these colleges speak to us in our own language; they are oriented to Western thinking; and they occupy important posts in the governmental, legal, commercial, and financial circles of the communities in which they live.” A former oil company executive, McGhee encouraged the Ford Foundation to provide funding to AUB, AUC, and Robert College. “We can think of no more important sphere of activity and interest for private American support,” McGhee added. Over the next decade, the Ford Foundation provided essential support to American universities in the Middle East, with AUB and AUC as the major beneficiaries.
Yet a few years later, the American educational institutions would face large budget deficits that threatened their existence. Other colleges and universities were nationalized or shuttered. John Case, Chairman of AUB’s Board of Trustees and Vice President of Socony Mobil Oil Company, contacted Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen Dulles, director of the CIA. John Foster and Allen Dulles had ties to American missionary organizations and the centers of political and financial power in Washington and New York. Allen Dulles also maintained an interest in American universities in the Middle East. After World War I, he was the head of the State Department’s Near East Division. He also served as the President of the NECA before becoming Deputy Director of the CIA and eventually Director. Case directly appealed to the Dulles brothers for assistance and over the next few years direct and indirect funding from the U.S. government and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations helped alleviate AUB’s budget deficit.
A Quiet Revolution
While AUB’s leadership sought financial assistance from Washington, they also attempted to align the university with America’s goals in the region. Following the 1956 Suez War, the Eisenhower administration attempted to contain the influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser regionally and internationally. AUB’s Case warned the State Department that Egypt had a leading role in the education of teachers in the Arab countries. Instead, he proposed that AUB train teachers and ensure they had a more favorable attitude toward the United States and its allies. Although the State Department did not adopt the proposal, it demonstrated the willingness of AUB’s leadership to support America’s foreign policy interests.
By the 1960s, AUB and AUC began receiving larger sums of financial assistance from Washington. Both universities sought to sustain local and regional support while also maintaining relations with the United States. Washington continued to view the universities as important outposts and centers for the training of students and government officials in a key region. In 1971, campus protests at AUB generated negative press coverage in American media. The U.S. State Department reassured critics on Capitol Hill that the university was “one of the finest educational institutions in the Middle East or Asia” and “has helped to bring a ‘quiet revolution’ to the Middle East, the effects of which will endure long after political slogans and nationalistic antipathies have lost their hold on the minds of men.” The late Cold War period proved difficult for AUB as it weathered a lengthy civil war in Lebanon. In contrast, AUC benefited from improved relations between Egypt and the United States under the regimes of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.3
Over the past decade, leading American universities have established new branch campuses across the Gulf. In part, these endeavors were related to Washington’s increased engagement in the region after the Cold War and the September 11, 2001 attacks. The new American educational institutions in the Middle East also reflect the wealth of the host countries and their desires for greater prominence in regional and international affairs. Whether these new institutions will have the longevity and influence of AUB and AUC is uncertain. Like their counterparts in Egypt and Lebanon, it is also unclear how they will balance their transnational identities while ensuring academic freedom.
Osamah F. Khalil is Associate Professor of History at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is the author of America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National State, which was the basis for this article.
1 Staub to Brown, December 4, 1931, Near East Relief Committee Records, series 2, box 2, folder 1, The Burke Library Archives, Columbia University Libraries, at Union Theological Seminary, New York.
2 See Osamah F. Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State (Harvard University Press, 2016), Chapter 4.
3 See Khalil, Chapter 7.
Can Civil Society Hold Intelligence Elites to Public Account?
Since ‘9/11’, intelligence elites have expanded in powers and scope. They have created controversial, illegal policies that contravene human rights, and have intruded into civil society in many ways. In Intelligence Elites and Public Accountability: Relationships of Influence with Civil Society, I examine how contemporary Anglo-American intelligence elites influence civil society (the press, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), citizens), but also how civil society resists, finding ways of holding intelligence elites to public account. Unfortunately, civil society faces many obstacles in this task.
What are intelligence elites?
‘Intelligence elites’ comprise those few people in interlocking political, economic and military domains making fundamental decisions on intelligence policies, such as new directions in how intelligence is collected or to what ends it is used. Such policies have far-reaching consequences for all citizens. For instance, everyone is affected by decisions on how the security of the collective is protected. Collective security may be sought through the shield of nuclear weapons’ Mutually Assured Destruction (a focus of C. Wright Mills’ critique 60 years ago).[i] Collective security may be sought through policies that use torture for interrogating terrorist suspects, which can initiate norm regress regarding the universal ban on torture and on complicity in torture, as politicians argue for torture as a useful policy option in ticking time-bomb situations.[ii] Collective security may be sought through bulk data collection (a.k.a. mass surveillance) of digital communications, which challenges privacy rights and generates chilling effects on journalists[iii] and entire populations.[iv]
When discussing the power elite, Mills focused on unpicking the interlocking, secretive and obscured elite relationships between America’s centralised political executive, military bureaucracy and giant corporations.[v] Similarly, my use of the term ‘intelligence elites’ focuses attention on the close ties between decision-makers making fundamental decisions on intelligence policies in intelligence agencies, and those in political, military and corporate domains.
On political domains, there has long been a close relationship between intelligence agencies and top politicians, especially the executive. This sometimes enables intelligence oversight by the legislature to be bypassed.[vi] Politicisation of intelligence is also a recurring phenomenon, where intelligence is misleadingly cherry-picked and presented to further political goals,[vii] like arguing for pre-emptive war.[viii] Beyond political connections, operational priorities since 9/11 have enabled intelligence elites to closely connect with military and corporate domains through symbiotic private consultancies. For instance, in 2010 The Washington Post identified over 1,200 US government entities, but over 1,900 private companies, working on counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence.[ix] There is a ‘revolving door’ between US intelligence and the private sector.[x] Meanwhile, public-private partnerships on intelligence have expanded in the UK as, for instance, cyber-security and digital surveillance require cooperation and compliance from telecommunications and social media platforms that privately own most of the critical infrastructure.[xi]
Intelligence elites and public accountability
Intelligence agencies are public servants working to maintain national security and the national interest.[xii] As such, they are subject to (imperfect and secretive) oversight mechanisms located within the agencies themselves, legislatures and judiciaries. But it is much harder to hold wider intelligence elites publicly accountable given not only their secretive, but diffuse, nature (i.e. their close ties to political, military and corporate entities). Intelligence elites, then, largely avoid the oversight mechanisms designed to scrutinise intelligence agencies.
Without resorting to ‘deep state’ logic,[xiii] lack of legislative scrutiny arises from factors such as lack of information flow,[xiv] compounded by private companies’ secret involvement;[xv] lack of critique, arising from the normally close relationship between top politicians and intelligence agencies,[xvi] and wider politicians’ co-opted, deferential relationship to the agencies;[xvii] and lack of attention to, or understanding of, intelligence issues,[xviii] producing vague laws that lend themselves to secret interpretations. Judicial oversight also suffers from lack of information flow, where governments invoke the states secrets privilege to shut down litigation on national security grounds;[xix] and from lack of critique, arising from deference to intelligence elites.[xx]
Yet, it is vitally important that intelligence elites are held publicly accountable, not least because Anglo-American intelligence elites have expanded in powers and scope in fighting the War on Terror (2001-). Their role in creating controversial, illegal policies that contravene the human rights to freedom from torture and to privacy is increasingly documented. For instance, intelligence elites in favour of, and complicit in, creating and perpetuating the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program (2001-09) included top officials in George W. Bush’s administration; and private US military psychologists (Mitchell, Jessen & Assoc.) who developed the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (a.k.a. torture);[xxi] and in the UK, MI5 and MI6 officials (and agency heads) were complicit in using information derived from torture and facilitating extraordinary renditions.[xxii]
Intelligence agencies are subject to formal oversight procedures, but this failed to prevent such illegal or controversial policies. Accountability of intelligence elites who devised these policies is hard to achieve, especially when the intelligence agency itself becomes the scapegoat – as was the case with the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. That program was terminated as President Obama took office in 2009, and a US Senate Intelligence inquiry was initiated to assess the policy, culminating in the Senate Intelligence Committee Report. Its Executive Summary was declassified in December 2014,[xxiii] as was the CIA’s response.[xxiv] The Senate Intelligence Committee Report lays the entire blame for the Detention and Interrogation Program on the CIA (for exaggerating the intelligence yielded by torture and for impeding official oversight mechanisms). Both the Senate Intelligence Committee Report and the CIA response focus on strengthening intelligence agency oversight via internal CIA reform, misdirecting attention from wider political responsibility or accountability, for instance, from policy-makers, the executive or lawyers responsible for the Program.[xxv]
This places an onus on civil society to step in, to try to hold intelligence elites to public account – to demand publicly that the intelligence elite delivers an explanatory account of their actions, takes the blame where things have gone wrong, and locates their activities within appropriate legal and moral frameworks. Such demands would require civil society to be able to publicly critique the accuracy and value of an administration’s public characterisation of intelligence; to probe whether intelligence elites have taken the requisite responsibility when responding to intelligence controversies; and to query the ethics, morality and legality of how intelligence is gained and for what it is used.[xxvi] But is civil society up to the job?
Obstacles to public accountability of intelligence elites
Civil society operates in a difficult environment when discussing intelligence elites. Alongside the secrecy surrounding intelligence issues, there is always uncertainty about what any evidence means, whether it is provided by sanitised official reports or unearthed via whistleblowing and critical investigations. By its nature, intelligence is uncertain as it is based on analysts’ risk assessments derived from piecemeal material of varying credibility.[xxvii] Such characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicised, is manipulable by those seeking to influence opinion, while civil society’s ability to assess claims is compromised by lack of independent evidence.
Arising from these constraints, civil society faces many challenges when dealing with intelligence elites. These include recognising and countering intelligence elite efforts to influence them. Such efforts include intelligence elite strategies of secrecy (even in the face of massive leaks); silencing (ranging from press censorship to prosecuting and harassing whistleblowers); and deceptive information provision (such as using selective declassification and coordinated messages to misdirect attention).
It is unsurprising, then, that whistleblowing leaks to the press on intelligence issues remain rare;[xxviii] that mainstream journalism is largely uncritical of intelligence elites;[xxix] and that politicians and intelligence agencies are privileged over NGOs or activists in news stories on intelligence issues.[xxx]
Towards greater public accountability
So, can contemporary civil society adequately hold intelligence elites publicly accountable? My short answer is ‘It can, but’ - an affirmative that is heavily qualified because of unequal relationships of influence between intelligence elites and civil society. Intelligence elites continue to target civil society with multiple strategies of influence. Civil society’s response varies. The mainstream press presents a mixed picture: notwithstanding notable exceptions, it largely succumbs to intelligence elites’ influence strategies. NGOs and activist groups play a strong resistive role in championing rights, but on intelligence issues, their voices are drowned out by the intelligence elite. Regarding citizens, the situation for those who would whistleblow to the press and public remains very precarious, as seen in the high-profile case of Edward Snowden. Snowden remains stranded in Russia, charged with felony violations under the US Espionage Act 1917 for his 2013 leaks on US digital mass surveillance policies, while the American intelligence elite discredits his mental state, character and motives, and the wider American press portrays him as a traitor.
So, what is to be done? A good start would be greater awareness among civil society actors themselves, of the many ways in which they may be influenced, prevailed upon, or manipulated when reporting on, or researching, intelligence elites. Such awareness could help prevent manipulative and deceptive information (a.k.a. propaganda) from pervading our public sphere.[xxxi] A net decrease in propaganda would go some way towards making citizens (and their elected political representatives) better informed about fundamental decisions concerning intelligence. This would counter the tendency towards lack of critique, and enable a more informed public discussion about the acceptability of intelligence policies that contravene human rights.[xxxii]
As such, I recommend that key organs of civil society open themselves up to critical self-reflection on their relationships of influence with intelligence elites. Public acknowledgement of the nature and scale of the problem could lead to shared notions of what public accountability of intelligence elites should look like, and then, how to achieve it.
Professor Vian Bakir, Political Communication & Journalism, University of Bangor
Twitter: @VianBakir1
Bibliograpy:
[i] Mills, C.W., 1958. The causes of World War Three. Simon and Schuster.
[ii] Bakir, V., 2016 [2013]. Torture, intelligence and sousveillance in the War on Terror: agenda–building struggles. Routledge.
[iii] Lashmar, P. 2017. No more sources? The impact of Snowden's revelations on journalists and their confidential sources. Journalism Practice, 11(6): 665-688.
[iv] Stoycheff, E., 2016. Under surveillance: examining Facebook’s spiral of silence effects in the wake of NSA internet monitoring. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(2): 1–16.
[v] Mills, C.W., 2000 [1956]. The power elite. New Ed edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[vi] Price, D.H. 2016. Cold War anthropology: the CIA, the Pentagon and the growth of dual use anthropology. London and Durham: Duke University Press.
[vii] Marrin, S., 2009. Intelligence analysis and decision-making: methodological challenges. In: P.Gill, S.Marrin and M.Phythian, eds. Intelligence theory: key questions and debates. London and New York: Routledge. pp.131-150.
[viii] Herring, E. & Robinson, P., 2014. Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government’s Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD. Political Science Quarterly
129(4): 551-583.
[ix] Priest, D. and Arkin, W.M., 2010. Top secret America: a hidden world, growing beyond control. The Washington Post, 19 July.
[x] Briant, E.L. 2015. Propaganda and counter-terrorism: strategies for global change. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[xi] Carr, M., 2016. Public–private partnerships in national cyber-security strategies. International Affairs, 92(1): 43–62.
[xii] Omand, D., 2010. Securing the state. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.
[xiii] Lofgren, M., 2016. The deep state: the fall of the constitution and the rise of a shadow government. New York: Penguin.
[xiv] Democratic Audit UK, 2016. How democratically accountable are the UK’s security and intelligence services? [pdf].
[xv] Gill, P., 2016. Intelligence democratisation: a comparative analysis of the limits of reform. London: Routledge.
[xvi] Johnson L.K., 2009. Sketches for a theory of strategic intelligence. In: P. Gill, S. Marrin and M. Phythian, eds. Intelligence theory: key questions and debates. London: Routledge. pp.33-53.
[xvii] Cormac, R., 2016. Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy. International Relations, 31(2), pp.169-191.
[xviii] Hintz, A. & Brown, I., 2017. Enabling digital citizenship? The reshaping of surveillance policy after Snowden. International Journal of Communication, 11: 782–801.
[xix] Bakir, V., 2016 [2013]. Torture, intelligence and sousveillance in the War on Terror: agenda–building struggles. Routledge.
[xx] Leigh, I., 2011. National courts and international intelligence cooperation. In: H. Born, I. Leigh and A. Wills, eds. International intelligence cooperation and accountability. London: Routledge. pp.231-251.
[xxi] Bakir, V., 2016 [2013]. Torture, intelligence and sousveillance in the War on Terror: agenda–building struggles. Routledge.
[xxii] ISC, 2018. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001-2010. HC1113.
[xxiii] Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC) Report, 2014. Executive Summary: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
[xxiv] CIA, 2013. Memorandum for the Honorable Dianne Feinstein, the Honorable Saxby Chambliss. CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program.
[xxv] Bakir, V., 2017. Political-Intelligence Elites, Strategic Political Communication and the Press. Intelligence and National Security, 32(1): 85-106.
[xxvi] Bakir, V., 2017. Political-Intelligence Elites, Strategic Political Communication and the Press. Intelligence and National Security, 32(1): 85-106.
[xxvii] Marrin, S., 2009. Intelligence analysis and decision-making: methodological challenges. In: P.Gill, S.Marrin and M.Phythian, eds. Intelligence theory: key questions and debates. London and New York: Routledge. pp.131-150.
[xxviii] Bakir, V., 2018. Intelligence elites and public accountability: relationships of influence with civil society. Routledge.
[xxix] Lashmar, P. 2018. From silence to primary definer: the emergence of an intelligence lobby in the public sphere. Critical Sociology [online first]; Lashmar, P., 2013. Urinal or conduit? Institutional information flow between the UK intelligence services and the news media. Journalism, 14(8): 1024-1040.
[xxx] Di Salvo, P. & Negro, G. 2016. Framing Edward Snowden: a comparative analysis of four newspapers in China, United Kingdom and United States. Journalism, 17(7): 805-822; Wahl-Jorgensen, K., Bennett, L.K. & Cable, J. 2016. Surveillance normalization and critique. Digital Journalism, 5(3): 386-403.
[xxxi] For more on propaganda, see Bakir, V. et al. 2018. Organized Persuasive Communication: A new conceptual framework for research on public relations, propaganda and promotional culture. Critical Sociology [online first].
[xxxii] Bakir, V. & McStay, A. 2018. The Sorry Tale of British Journalism and our Right to Privacy. Enforcing human rights. Written evidence from Media & Persuasive Communication network to Joint Committee on Human Rights Inquiry. (AET0043)
The New Power Elite: Charles Wright Mills's Work Still Relevant Today as Ever
Charles Wright Mills, author of the seminal work The Power Elite
When a handful of rich bankers crashed the world economy in 2008, they seemed to launch a domino effect that would send other elite groups tumbling. Discontent was already simmering over the unevenness of gains from economic growth, which had moved the richest much further ahead while denying real pay increases to those who most needed them. The resultant pressure on ordinary families (even in rich countries) to borrow for everyday expenses – to the point of default on mortgages, car loans or credit card debt – seemed to highlight the dead end to which ‘expert’ social and financial engineering had ultimately led.
Financial crisis was widely perceived as a consequence of globalization, privatization and deregulation ‘projects’ devised and imposed by small, unaccountable elites - which gained disproportionately, then got rescued at public expense. The prospect of years of austerity for lower-paid households, to repay government debts run up in preserving bankers’ bonuses, raised this silent-majority anger to boiling point. An international Occupy movement demanded radical curbs on financial activity whose own ex-regulators confessed to be “socially useless”.
The ensuing Great Recession lengthened the charge-sheet against elite rule. It exposed unseen flaws in the Eurozone, designed by a multinational clique who seemed to have left out key features of a functioning monetary union. A concomitant worsening of terror threats in Europe and the US could be traced to chaotic ‘regime changes’ by misguided political and military elites - which then cynically profited from their error by restricting civil liberties in the name of national security. Post-crash downturns and welfare cuts played a major role in persuading the English to opt for Brexit, and Americans to vote for Donald Trump. Where voting was less effective, mass demonstrations challenged autocratic rulers in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet Union.
Rebounding Still Higher
Ten years on, the elites that once seemed threatened by these developments have capitalised on it, emerging stronger than ever around the world. Dictatorships ringed by financial oligarchies are as prevalent as ever, while a growing number of democracies conceal similar aligned concentrations of political and economic power, or use these to justify illiberalism. Political choices, from combating poverty and gun crime to resolving tensions in Korea and the Middle East, are presented as so complex as to be soluble only by small informed groups, under cursory democratic control. The political ‘pyramid’ seems to be stretched further skywards by technological change, enriching and empowering those who amass and mine the ‘big’ data which billions willingly submit to their control.
Yet the idea that small groups shape our politics and society, by concentrating decisions that affect millions of lives, is as unpopular now as when C Wright Mills asserted it (in the context of the US) over sixty years ago. Mills’s (1956) The Power Elite was condemned by liberal opinion, which believed that the market economy and wide, small-scale private property ownership guaranteed a ‘pluralism’ in which many small decisions shaped collective outcomes. It was equally vehemently dismissed but conservatives, who were more inclined to agree that power lay with a small circle at the top, but believed this was a good thing – investing power in those best placed to use it, for the benefit of all.
Most disappointingly (for Mills and for the progressive cause he promoted), the claim was widely condemned on the left, which still wished to present social classes as the driving force of change. Elites were viewed as a distraction, composed largely of figureheads whose decisions were shaped by the conflict of more numerous groups below them. The idea of a small, nameable elite ‘ruling the world’ is quickly dismissed as conspiracy theory, even by chroniclers who acknowledge and condemn uneven distributions of power.
Radical commentators since Mills have consequently deflected their attack towards privileged groups who fall outside the elites he identified. For example, they attack libertarian and free-market pressure groups (such as the American Enterprise Institute and Britain’s Institute of Economic Affairs) that are mainly sponsored by (and push the laissez-faire interests of) small businesses, lumping them with large corporations that are friendlier to state-led regulation. They tend also to conflate the political and commercial elites with the ‘1%’ of economically richest - glossing a more complex interconnection among the three, both in composition and interests.
This scattergun attack on privilege has allowed its real beneficiaries to commandeer the anti-elitist banner, with disturbing success. The UK’s Brexit campaigners successfully painted the leaders of all the main political parties – left, centre, right and nationalist – as creatures of a Europeanised elite which no longer cared about people doing ordinary jobs on ordinary wages. They can now invoke the ‘will of the people’ to justify a new push for domestic deregulation and international free trade, precisely the opposite of what most Leave voters seem to have wanted.
A Brexit deal that will profoundly affect millions can thus be shaped by a huddle of powerful negotiators, behind the scenes and with little accountability. And if it does not meet Leave voters’ expectations, Brexiteers will blame an elite on the opposing side for maliciously thwarting their grand plans. Across the Atlantic, Trump’s signature first-year achievements were to bolster his own commercial empire and finance a tax-cut for the rich partly paid for by axing healthcare for the most vulnerable. This doesn’t dampen his campaign claims to be reviving the rustbelt and draining the swamp.
The New Power Elite
In The New Power Elite (a title we co-opted because no-one else had directly revisited Mills’s concerns) we show how, historically and now, seemingly grass-roots rebellions are stoked and managed by members of the elite. These are sometimes people in the ‘inner circle’ who are losing an argument around the top table, and opt to rally dissent from the masses outside the palace in order to change opinions within it. They may also be ambitious outsiders on the edge of the ruling group, excluded from the big decisions, who foment unrest in groups below them to advance their case for admission.
A ‘middle class’, when economic progress creates one, is sometimes the force that elite fractions try to unleash when their differences cannot be settled internally. But when conservative forces within the elite have brought the middle class onside, it is the working class or the even more deprived ‘precariat’ that the elite’s dissenting voices seek to mobilise in pursuit of reform. The long-noted circulation of elites is made inevitable because their success is self-destabilising. Long periods of public order and rising prosperity entrap the ruling group in outmoded strategies and vested interests while allowing them to achieve social closure, blocking the peaceful entry of new members with fresh ideas.
Such tensions are often resolved by a ‘palace coup’ that shifts elite policy and composition without any outside involvement. Bigger threats to elites’ power arise when one fraction reaches out to rebellious groups beyond the palace gates. Usually, the fractions who unleash such street or ballot-box protests quickly suppress them again once safely installed. But occasionally, mass protest orchestrated from the top goes further than its elite sponsors wanted.
In the case of Trump, wrong-footed Republicans soon reined in their maverick candidate and his unlikely working-class supporters, steering his presidency towards a deregulation and corporate welfare strategy that in many ways continues the unfinished Reagan neoliberal revolution. The chances of Brexit being steered towards an outcome that suits the present political and economic elite are less clearcut. But desperate measures to do so can be expected – from all political sides – in the remaining months to 29 March 2019.
Elite studies have too long remained a sideline in the social sciences, with more attention still focused on the role of classes (and class conflict) or identity politics in keeping societies stable and in making them change. By re-visiting Mills, in the light of six more decades of global and intellectual development, we aim to give those at the top of the decision-tree a similar place on the research agenda.
Alan Shipman: Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Open University
June Edmunds: School of Law, Politics & Sociology, University of Sussex
Bryan S. Turner: Graduate Center, City University of New York; Institute for Religion, Politics & Society, Australian Catholic University
Financial crisis was widely perceived as a consequence of globalization, privatization and deregulation ‘projects’ devised and imposed by small, unaccountable elites - which gained disproportionately, then got rescued at public expense. The prospect of years of austerity for lower-paid households, to repay government debts run up in preserving bankers’ bonuses, raised this silent-majority anger to boiling point. An international Occupy movement demanded radical curbs on financial activity whose own ex-regulators confessed to be “socially useless”.
The ensuing Great Recession lengthened the charge-sheet against elite rule. It exposed unseen flaws in the Eurozone, designed by a multinational clique who seemed to have left out key features of a functioning monetary union. A concomitant worsening of terror threats in Europe and the US could be traced to chaotic ‘regime changes’ by misguided political and military elites - which then cynically profited from their error by restricting civil liberties in the name of national security. Post-crash downturns and welfare cuts played a major role in persuading the English to opt for Brexit, and Americans to vote for Donald Trump. Where voting was less effective, mass demonstrations challenged autocratic rulers in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet Union.
Rebounding Still Higher
Ten years on, the elites that once seemed threatened by these developments have capitalised on it, emerging stronger than ever around the world. Dictatorships ringed by financial oligarchies are as prevalent as ever, while a growing number of democracies conceal similar aligned concentrations of political and economic power, or use these to justify illiberalism. Political choices, from combating poverty and gun crime to resolving tensions in Korea and the Middle East, are presented as so complex as to be soluble only by small informed groups, under cursory democratic control. The political ‘pyramid’ seems to be stretched further skywards by technological change, enriching and empowering those who amass and mine the ‘big’ data which billions willingly submit to their control.
Yet the idea that small groups shape our politics and society, by concentrating decisions that affect millions of lives, is as unpopular now as when C Wright Mills asserted it (in the context of the US) over sixty years ago. Mills’s (1956) The Power Elite was condemned by liberal opinion, which believed that the market economy and wide, small-scale private property ownership guaranteed a ‘pluralism’ in which many small decisions shaped collective outcomes. It was equally vehemently dismissed but conservatives, who were more inclined to agree that power lay with a small circle at the top, but believed this was a good thing – investing power in those best placed to use it, for the benefit of all.
Most disappointingly (for Mills and for the progressive cause he promoted), the claim was widely condemned on the left, which still wished to present social classes as the driving force of change. Elites were viewed as a distraction, composed largely of figureheads whose decisions were shaped by the conflict of more numerous groups below them. The idea of a small, nameable elite ‘ruling the world’ is quickly dismissed as conspiracy theory, even by chroniclers who acknowledge and condemn uneven distributions of power.
Radical commentators since Mills have consequently deflected their attack towards privileged groups who fall outside the elites he identified. For example, they attack libertarian and free-market pressure groups (such as the American Enterprise Institute and Britain’s Institute of Economic Affairs) that are mainly sponsored by (and push the laissez-faire interests of) small businesses, lumping them with large corporations that are friendlier to state-led regulation. They tend also to conflate the political and commercial elites with the ‘1%’ of economically richest - glossing a more complex interconnection among the three, both in composition and interests.
This scattergun attack on privilege has allowed its real beneficiaries to commandeer the anti-elitist banner, with disturbing success. The UK’s Brexit campaigners successfully painted the leaders of all the main political parties – left, centre, right and nationalist – as creatures of a Europeanised elite which no longer cared about people doing ordinary jobs on ordinary wages. They can now invoke the ‘will of the people’ to justify a new push for domestic deregulation and international free trade, precisely the opposite of what most Leave voters seem to have wanted.
A Brexit deal that will profoundly affect millions can thus be shaped by a huddle of powerful negotiators, behind the scenes and with little accountability. And if it does not meet Leave voters’ expectations, Brexiteers will blame an elite on the opposing side for maliciously thwarting their grand plans. Across the Atlantic, Trump’s signature first-year achievements were to bolster his own commercial empire and finance a tax-cut for the rich partly paid for by axing healthcare for the most vulnerable. This doesn’t dampen his campaign claims to be reviving the rustbelt and draining the swamp.
The New Power Elite
In The New Power Elite (a title we co-opted because no-one else had directly revisited Mills’s concerns) we show how, historically and now, seemingly grass-roots rebellions are stoked and managed by members of the elite. These are sometimes people in the ‘inner circle’ who are losing an argument around the top table, and opt to rally dissent from the masses outside the palace in order to change opinions within it. They may also be ambitious outsiders on the edge of the ruling group, excluded from the big decisions, who foment unrest in groups below them to advance their case for admission.
A ‘middle class’, when economic progress creates one, is sometimes the force that elite fractions try to unleash when their differences cannot be settled internally. But when conservative forces within the elite have brought the middle class onside, it is the working class or the even more deprived ‘precariat’ that the elite’s dissenting voices seek to mobilise in pursuit of reform. The long-noted circulation of elites is made inevitable because their success is self-destabilising. Long periods of public order and rising prosperity entrap the ruling group in outmoded strategies and vested interests while allowing them to achieve social closure, blocking the peaceful entry of new members with fresh ideas.
Such tensions are often resolved by a ‘palace coup’ that shifts elite policy and composition without any outside involvement. Bigger threats to elites’ power arise when one fraction reaches out to rebellious groups beyond the palace gates. Usually, the fractions who unleash such street or ballot-box protests quickly suppress them again once safely installed. But occasionally, mass protest orchestrated from the top goes further than its elite sponsors wanted.
In the case of Trump, wrong-footed Republicans soon reined in their maverick candidate and his unlikely working-class supporters, steering his presidency towards a deregulation and corporate welfare strategy that in many ways continues the unfinished Reagan neoliberal revolution. The chances of Brexit being steered towards an outcome that suits the present political and economic elite are less clearcut. But desperate measures to do so can be expected – from all political sides – in the remaining months to 29 March 2019.
Elite studies have too long remained a sideline in the social sciences, with more attention still focused on the role of classes (and class conflict) or identity politics in keeping societies stable and in making them change. By re-visiting Mills, in the light of six more decades of global and intellectual development, we aim to give those at the top of the decision-tree a similar place on the research agenda.
Alan Shipman: Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Open University
June Edmunds: School of Law, Politics & Sociology, University of Sussex
Bryan S. Turner: Graduate Center, City University of New York; Institute for Religion, Politics & Society, Australian Catholic University
Propaganda and Elite Power
Propaganda Architect & Prominent Member of the US Establishment, Edward Bernays
Propaganda and manipulative forms of Organised Persuasive Communication (OPC) are central to the exercise of political and economic power and yet, over time, our awareness of these activities has been significantly blunted.
This has not always been the case and, historically, early theorists of propaganda such as Harold Lasswell[1] and Walter Lippman[2] openly advocated the intelligent manipulation of public opinion and, indeed, saw this as essential to democracy. However, as Edward Bernays revealingly noted, ‘propaganda got to be a bad word because of the Germans ... using it [during WW1].[3] So what I did was to ... find some other words. So we found the words Counsel on Public Relations.’ Since then, a plethora of terms have come to be used to denote activities which, although not always, involve systematic and coordinated strategies to manipulate opinions and behaviours. In addition to public relations, terms such as strategic communication, perception management, political communication, political marketing, advertising, public diplomacy have all helped to obfuscate the manipulative and frequently deceptive communication strategies that powerful actors employ. As Carey wryly notes, ‘the success of business propaganda in persuading us ... that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant achievements of the twentieth century’.[4] For some, such as the late British historian Professor Phil Taylor, these deceptions and self deceptions were profoundly unproductive: he observed that ‘an entire euphemism industry has developed to deflect attention away from the realities of’ propaganda, and that ‘despite the euphemism game, democracies have grown ever more sophisticated at conducting propaganda, however labeled, which only they deny to be propaganda in the first place.’[5]
The consequences of our failure to fully recognise these realities are deleterious for democracy, accountability and, arguably, good decision making. For example, the recent Chilcot Inquiry has, whilst offering a damning indictment of the Blair government and how it took Britain to war in Iraq, also provided surprisingly revealing information regarding the origins of the Iraq War and the centrality of propaganda to the West’s ‘war on terror’. Indeed, perhaps the most damning information emerging from the 7 year long Chilcot Inquiry relates to the origins of UK involvement in this ill-fated enterprise. As the early parts of the report makes clear, the genesis of British involvement in the Iraq War lay in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when elements within the US administration sought to take advantage of the event in order to pursue a long standing objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. The report quotes a British embassy report dated 15 September 2001 which states that ‘The “regime-change hawks” in Washington were arguing that a coalition put together for one purpose (against international terrorism) could be used to clear up other problems in the region.’ (Section 3.1, p.324). The report then cites Blair’s considerations with respect to the emerging ‘war on terror’ strategy:
"… in order to give ourselves space [it is important] that we say: “Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan because it’s there that the perpetrators of 11 September hide.
“Phase 2 is the medium and longer term campaign against terrorism in all its forms. Of course we will discuss that … This kicks it away for the moment but leaves all options open. We just don’t need it debated freely in public until we know what exactly we want to do; and how we can do it.”
Mr Blair concluded that a “dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit” was required, and suggested that he and President Bush should “talk soon”. In this context, Chilcot also makes clear Blair’s preferred tactic with respect to how to promote the war, and presumably a central output of his suggested ‘tightly knit propaganda unit’, was to effectively exaggerate and mislead with respect to the alleged WMD threat posed by Iraq: ‘The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and intent … That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed”. In a nutshell, this appears to be support from an official source for the thesis that the ‘war on terror’ has been exploited in order to pursue wars to ‘clear up other problems’ and that, as a part of this, Western publics have been manipulated and deceived via propaganda, ‘clever’ strategies and threat exaggeration. Needless to say these findings decidedly open up the need for a full investigation by mainstream academics with regard to the strategic backdrop to the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war and its connection with neoconservative aspirations regarding power and influence in the Middle east and the question of resources and oil.
The events surrounding the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq invasion, of course, are not unique and need to be understood as indicative of a broader systematic problem in democracies whereby power is exercised via manipulation of information and in ways which are frequently corrosive to good governance, justice and democracy. Further examples abound: for example, public awareness of the plight of the Palestinian peoples in the West Bank and Gaza strip, after a few years of optimism following the 1993 Oslo Accords, would appear to have been clouded by robust propaganda aimed at presenting the conflict as one of Israel’s defence against ideological extremists and terrorists, rather than the occupation and progressive take over of land that is allocated, by international law and the United Nations, to the Palestinians. The possibility of anything approaching a reasonable or just settlement for the Palestinians is rapidly slipping away as the living situation in the Gaza strip worsens and more land is taken from Palestinians in the West Bank.[6] Away from the realm of conflict and war, the role of propaganda and persuasion with respect to the tobacco industry, which worked tirelessly for decades to help obscure the health risks of smoking, and also more recently the fossil fuel industry which has sought to sow seeds of doubt regarding human impact on global warming, highlight the role of propaganda (they call it ‘PR’) in the service of big business.[7] In short, propaganda and the ‘intelligent manipulation of the mind’ play a central role in defining issues of our time, are central to the exercise of power, and have profound implications for how we understand governance and the state of our democracy.
Engagement with manipulative propaganda is essential if we are to tackle the major issues of our time. War, climate change, diminishing resources and acute poverty are matters of profound importance now confronting humanity and, if we are to have any hope of grappling with these issues, then people need to be able to learn how to become better informed and to defend themselves against strategies of manipulation and deception. Part of this process involves becoming more aware of the fact that manipulative communication, propaganda, is a key part of the way in which powerful actors wield power in the world. Starting to recognize and to see through these strategies is an essential first step. But much more is needed. Mainstream academia has been surprisingly reluctant toward full on engagement with theorizing and researching manipulative communication and many researchers tend to fall back on the euphemisms of the powerful such as ‘strategic communication’ and ‘perception management’ or ‘PR’. Academics need to start to study more closely the doctrines, practices and institutions that lie behind these activities as well as produce more empirical evidence and case study material in order to help reveal major examples of manipulation and deception. Also, journalists and their professional autonomy are an essential part of any democratic system and should be a vital part of challenging and counteracting the kinds of manipulations described above. The institution of journalism needs as much strengthening as possible in order to improve levels of journalistic professional autonomy. Finally, given the scale of the problem, and the need for the public, academics and journalists to all be involved in holding power to account, it is perhaps time to give a rebirth to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis which might serve to coordinate the activities and multiple engagements needed across the academy, the public and media professionals.
These are challenging times and there is urgent work to be done. But the stakes are very high and, in an era of multiple global crises, our future depends upon it.
Piers Robinson is Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism at the Department of Journalism Studies, University of Sheffield. Follow him on Twitter.
Further Reading
Emma Briant (2015) Propaganda and Counterterrorism: Strategies for Global Change, Manchester University Press.
David Miller and Willliam Dinan (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
Christopher Simpson. (1994). Science of Coercion: communication research and psychological warfare 1945-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philip M. Taylor (2002) War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[1] Lasswell, H., Casey, R. and Smith, B. L. (1935). Propaganda and Promotional Activities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[2] Lippman, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
[3] Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
[4] Carey, A. (1997). Taking the Risk out of Democracy. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. pp: 20-21.
[5] Taylor, P.M. (2002), ‘Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism’, Journal of Information Warfare, 1(3): 16-29: 20.
[6] Philo, Greg and Mike Berry (2011) More Bad News from Israel (Pluto Books) and The Occupation of the American Mind, (2016) The Media Education Foundation.
[7] Oreskes, Naomi and Eric M. Conway Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, (Bloomsbury).
This has not always been the case and, historically, early theorists of propaganda such as Harold Lasswell[1] and Walter Lippman[2] openly advocated the intelligent manipulation of public opinion and, indeed, saw this as essential to democracy. However, as Edward Bernays revealingly noted, ‘propaganda got to be a bad word because of the Germans ... using it [during WW1].[3] So what I did was to ... find some other words. So we found the words Counsel on Public Relations.’ Since then, a plethora of terms have come to be used to denote activities which, although not always, involve systematic and coordinated strategies to manipulate opinions and behaviours. In addition to public relations, terms such as strategic communication, perception management, political communication, political marketing, advertising, public diplomacy have all helped to obfuscate the manipulative and frequently deceptive communication strategies that powerful actors employ. As Carey wryly notes, ‘the success of business propaganda in persuading us ... that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant achievements of the twentieth century’.[4] For some, such as the late British historian Professor Phil Taylor, these deceptions and self deceptions were profoundly unproductive: he observed that ‘an entire euphemism industry has developed to deflect attention away from the realities of’ propaganda, and that ‘despite the euphemism game, democracies have grown ever more sophisticated at conducting propaganda, however labeled, which only they deny to be propaganda in the first place.’[5]
The consequences of our failure to fully recognise these realities are deleterious for democracy, accountability and, arguably, good decision making. For example, the recent Chilcot Inquiry has, whilst offering a damning indictment of the Blair government and how it took Britain to war in Iraq, also provided surprisingly revealing information regarding the origins of the Iraq War and the centrality of propaganda to the West’s ‘war on terror’. Indeed, perhaps the most damning information emerging from the 7 year long Chilcot Inquiry relates to the origins of UK involvement in this ill-fated enterprise. As the early parts of the report makes clear, the genesis of British involvement in the Iraq War lay in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when elements within the US administration sought to take advantage of the event in order to pursue a long standing objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. The report quotes a British embassy report dated 15 September 2001 which states that ‘The “regime-change hawks” in Washington were arguing that a coalition put together for one purpose (against international terrorism) could be used to clear up other problems in the region.’ (Section 3.1, p.324). The report then cites Blair’s considerations with respect to the emerging ‘war on terror’ strategy:
"… in order to give ourselves space [it is important] that we say: “Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan because it’s there that the perpetrators of 11 September hide.
“Phase 2 is the medium and longer term campaign against terrorism in all its forms. Of course we will discuss that … This kicks it away for the moment but leaves all options open. We just don’t need it debated freely in public until we know what exactly we want to do; and how we can do it.”
Mr Blair concluded that a “dedicated tightly knit propaganda unit” was required, and suggested that he and President Bush should “talk soon”. In this context, Chilcot also makes clear Blair’s preferred tactic with respect to how to promote the war, and presumably a central output of his suggested ‘tightly knit propaganda unit’, was to effectively exaggerate and mislead with respect to the alleged WMD threat posed by Iraq: ‘The tactics chosen by Mr Blair were to emphasise the threat which Iraq might pose, rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and intent … That remained Mr Blair’s approach in the months that followed”. In a nutshell, this appears to be support from an official source for the thesis that the ‘war on terror’ has been exploited in order to pursue wars to ‘clear up other problems’ and that, as a part of this, Western publics have been manipulated and deceived via propaganda, ‘clever’ strategies and threat exaggeration. Needless to say these findings decidedly open up the need for a full investigation by mainstream academics with regard to the strategic backdrop to the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war and its connection with neoconservative aspirations regarding power and influence in the Middle east and the question of resources and oil.
The events surrounding the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq invasion, of course, are not unique and need to be understood as indicative of a broader systematic problem in democracies whereby power is exercised via manipulation of information and in ways which are frequently corrosive to good governance, justice and democracy. Further examples abound: for example, public awareness of the plight of the Palestinian peoples in the West Bank and Gaza strip, after a few years of optimism following the 1993 Oslo Accords, would appear to have been clouded by robust propaganda aimed at presenting the conflict as one of Israel’s defence against ideological extremists and terrorists, rather than the occupation and progressive take over of land that is allocated, by international law and the United Nations, to the Palestinians. The possibility of anything approaching a reasonable or just settlement for the Palestinians is rapidly slipping away as the living situation in the Gaza strip worsens and more land is taken from Palestinians in the West Bank.[6] Away from the realm of conflict and war, the role of propaganda and persuasion with respect to the tobacco industry, which worked tirelessly for decades to help obscure the health risks of smoking, and also more recently the fossil fuel industry which has sought to sow seeds of doubt regarding human impact on global warming, highlight the role of propaganda (they call it ‘PR’) in the service of big business.[7] In short, propaganda and the ‘intelligent manipulation of the mind’ play a central role in defining issues of our time, are central to the exercise of power, and have profound implications for how we understand governance and the state of our democracy.
Engagement with manipulative propaganda is essential if we are to tackle the major issues of our time. War, climate change, diminishing resources and acute poverty are matters of profound importance now confronting humanity and, if we are to have any hope of grappling with these issues, then people need to be able to learn how to become better informed and to defend themselves against strategies of manipulation and deception. Part of this process involves becoming more aware of the fact that manipulative communication, propaganda, is a key part of the way in which powerful actors wield power in the world. Starting to recognize and to see through these strategies is an essential first step. But much more is needed. Mainstream academia has been surprisingly reluctant toward full on engagement with theorizing and researching manipulative communication and many researchers tend to fall back on the euphemisms of the powerful such as ‘strategic communication’ and ‘perception management’ or ‘PR’. Academics need to start to study more closely the doctrines, practices and institutions that lie behind these activities as well as produce more empirical evidence and case study material in order to help reveal major examples of manipulation and deception. Also, journalists and their professional autonomy are an essential part of any democratic system and should be a vital part of challenging and counteracting the kinds of manipulations described above. The institution of journalism needs as much strengthening as possible in order to improve levels of journalistic professional autonomy. Finally, given the scale of the problem, and the need for the public, academics and journalists to all be involved in holding power to account, it is perhaps time to give a rebirth to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis which might serve to coordinate the activities and multiple engagements needed across the academy, the public and media professionals.
These are challenging times and there is urgent work to be done. But the stakes are very high and, in an era of multiple global crises, our future depends upon it.
Piers Robinson is Professor of Politics, Society and Political Journalism at the Department of Journalism Studies, University of Sheffield. Follow him on Twitter.
Further Reading
Emma Briant (2015) Propaganda and Counterterrorism: Strategies for Global Change, Manchester University Press.
David Miller and Willliam Dinan (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
Christopher Simpson. (1994). Science of Coercion: communication research and psychological warfare 1945-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philip M. Taylor (2002) War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[1] Lasswell, H., Casey, R. and Smith, B. L. (1935). Propaganda and Promotional Activities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[2] Lippman, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
[3] Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2008). A Century of Spin. London: Pluto Press.
[4] Carey, A. (1997). Taking the Risk out of Democracy. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. pp: 20-21.
[5] Taylor, P.M. (2002), ‘Perception Management and the ‘War’ Against Terrorism’, Journal of Information Warfare, 1(3): 16-29: 20.
[6] Philo, Greg and Mike Berry (2011) More Bad News from Israel (Pluto Books) and The Occupation of the American Mind, (2016) The Media Education Foundation.
[7] Oreskes, Naomi and Eric M. Conway Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, (Bloomsbury).
